

Introduction

Changing economic imperatives of developing societies in the 1990s made way for a Foucauldian analysis of policy as an instrument of modern governance. At the end of the 1980s many countries in Asia and Africa realized the starkness of their external debt (World Development Report 1997, Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Money borrowed from international economic agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for projects of social and economic reconstruction of these erstwhile colonies since the 1940s had become an unpayable debt by the 1980s (Sengupta 1997, Snider 1996, Kurian 1992, Kohli 1991). Thereafter began a series of advisements by the debtor agencies to the debtor nations to liberalize their economies and introduce radical structural adjustment programs (World Development Report 1997). Nations were threatened with default on their debts and therefore with disqualification from disbursement of any future or pending loans if these measures were not adopted at the earliest. 1990s, for many developing societies, including India, marked the crisis of policy. Political decision-makers here faced the possibility of public and private discontent in discontinuing its entrenched public sector units and laying off its substantial work-force in favor of private entrepreneurship, national and international. To privatize or not was the question posed in the context of at least four decades of the policy of protectionism (Kohli 1986). Yet it was the same policy of an insulated economy or of the protection of nationalized private interests that was questioned in the light of the debt crisis. The political decisions such as the scrapping of the Monopoly Trade Practices Act, reduction in the import duty from 400% to 50% and the devaluation of the Indian currency in 1991, pointed to the trajectory of economic policy-making that took note of

the extent of the debt and of its urgent alleviation through structural changes to the economy (India's Economic Survey 1997). For political theorists, especially those who were statist, the scenario foregrounded a new question: who was making policy? If the modern nation-state was established as the principal guardian of its national borders, arbiter of citizenship, and responsible for domestic and foreign policy, the transnational nature of imperatives of policy in the 1990s questioned the jurisdiction and power of the states as well as of the feasibility of the concept of the state.

In western political thought since the 1950s, authoritative decision-making about and affecting the social was always located in the state, even if the concept itself was sometimes abandoned and replaced by others like political system as a response to accommodating the plethora of socio-political and cultural changes at different moments in time. For example, the political scientist Gabriel Almond (1959), as a response to the "emerging threat of communism's spread to the newly independent nations," suggested replacing the term state with political system. If the notion of the state was co-relative to a bounded political entity, the notion of political system created the image of interconnectedness between political entities that were also necessarily infused with western principles of democracy, deference to political authority, and civic culture. Subsequently, other political scientists took on the task of explaining not only the components of this political system but also their inter-relationships, without abandoning the conceptual separation between the political and social. Theda Skocpol (1979), to cite another example, concerned herself with the political will of the state to build and rebuild itself in response to intense social upheavals or interest-group pressures. She therefore identified the political system as an interactive space for the state and non-state elements

but where the state was always placed first in the hierarchy of power because of its autonomous character and immense resourcefulness to adapt (Skocpol 1979: 68). Still others like Akhil Gupta (1990) took cognizance of transnational flows of capital and with it information, tastes, and styles of being in order to reconceptualize the idea of the state in the context of the 1990s. In such a context, where the very idea of space was being recast, Gupta prefers to examine how state is experienced in the everyday lives of regular people and how we can find clues to the notion of the state in the articulations of these experiences. In other words, Gupta interests us in the contention that changing material realities that link the local with the international in complex ways also change the way we talk about the state or experience it accordingly.

Gupta's formulation also questions the previous understanding of policy as the political intention of the state and created solely at its behest. Yet the formulation also assists the genesis of a new question—could policy be now posited as a process located simultaneously in multiple locations and generated through discussions/ compromise between multiple agents? If so, then how best could the phenomenon of globalization, and of policy-making in its context, be captured? Anthropological inquiry in the 1990s then focused on policy as a process: its language, its agents, and its intended/actual social effects rather than as the intention of the state as a geographically bounded entity in an inter-state system (Shore and Wright 1997, Gordon and Young 1993, Ball 1990). The discursive nature of policy was thus brought within the purview of inquiry along with its dispersed effects at the level of the local. Because of the altered theoretical perspective on policy, research methodologies like ethnography were also re-theorized and reconfigured such that they could capture these new, complex realities. Globalization entailed a shift

from a “two-dimensional Euclidian space,” with its centers and peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multi-dimensional global space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating sub-spaces (Kearney 1995: 549). To extend the argument, globalization imploded the theoretical and real space between a bounded global and a bounded local. Ethnography’s privileged domain, of explaining while bounding the local, now lay open to re-evaluation. If earlier the view of the world as a “mosaic of separate cultures is what made it possible to bound the ethnographic object as well as see generalizations from a multiplicity of separate cases,” then globalization severely tested that view and the theoretical basis of the method to describe it (Gupta and Ferguson 1995: 68). Yet ethnography’s multi-method approach to explaining even boundedness of culture was still valuable to explain the process and its effects at multiple levels. Ethnography’s use of observations, interviews, and archival research as methods of explaining everything within the local was still considered valuable to mapping complex new realities. Globalization therefore unhinged ethnography from its obsession with explaining everything within a culture as a way to privilege it as a holistic entity within a world system. It also allowed, therefore, for policy making along with policy-based effects to become ethnographic fodder. Alternately, ethnographic explications on policy-making could then provide insights into the nature of globalization that engenders changes in it and through it in matters of governance and nationness.

The shifts in theoretical debates around state and policy in the context of globalization and its methods of study also reflected in reformulating the question around colonialism. It now became possible to re-examine assertions about colonialism not only as a unified body of knowledge about the other but one produced as such and as a

conscious exercise of power. It became possible to deconstruct the notion of colonial hegemony and reconstruct therefore the processes through which this hegemony was achieved and deployed. In other words, it now became possible to reapply the foucauldian analysis to the study of colonialism and regard “it” as sets of contesting discourses that over time, and within particular contextual realities, coalesced into a definitive statement of the problem, its effect, and instruments for producing such an effect. So instead of using vocabularies of the modern state to interpret colonialism and mark it also as a moment in the trajectory of the development of the modern state, new vocabularies of practices and political rationalities surrounding such practices in the colonial context became important to create. For example, David Ludden developed the notion of “world development regime” as constituting many actors, including different world governments, but all united in and giving force to the discourse of development. The origins of this regime, Ludden locates in 19th century capitalism-colonialism combine and that continues to be perpetuated in the today’s context by the “bourgeois elite,” who inherited colonial ways of thinking about development and stateness (Ludden 1997: 249). Despite being an important formulation and one that helps understand the colonial “origins” of the institutionalization of development and of individuals who contributed to it, yet we get no clues to the nature of the process through here. We are left with the assumption that the process and intention are the same. In other words, we can understand colonial power as one conscious of itself and its ways to produce particular effects on the material and cultural lives of the colonized. That colonial power was aware of its own teleology and fulfilled it in very certain ways, is what we are left to read here. Yet it is precisely here that other theoretic formulations about colonial power can be

inserted. Scofield, for example, argues for an understanding colonial power as a field which not only includes discourses about what needs to be targeted for change but also specifications for instruments and modalities of change. This allows us to argue that colonial power was discursively created as much as it was materially created. It also helps us suggest that both processes, while being inter-dependent, are fragmented and contentious, often violent as well. In other words, conquest and discourses proceed through a process of conflict and resolution; through continuities and discontinuities; through argument and agreement before they finish or are homogenized into an authoritative statement of political intention and practice.

This paper is modeled along these sets of theoretic notes on policy and methods of its study with nineteenth century colonial India as its chief focus. More specifically, it is an ethnography of the colonial policy on education in the nineteenth century. The paper examines the process through which the colonial policy on education in India was constituted, and how in its unambiguity, in terms of the statement of problem and its effect, lay the preciseness with which colonial governmentality began to operate in the everyday lives of the subject-population. Put another way, in the preciseness of policy lay the power of colonial governmentality. But this preciseness was constructed and was not a given. It was achieved, not assumed. The formal and precise structure of policy statements belie the contending nature of ideas in circulation and the contextual factors that favor the formalization of one complementary set of ideas into policy rather than another. If the success of colonial governmentality is located in its claims to scientificism and preciseness of articulation of the problem and nature of intervention, then how this relation has come to be and maintained is the subject of investigation here. This

investigation is important because only through examination of the set of ideas competing for recognition into policy can one understand how hierarchy of ideas is created—why certain ideas make it in the realm of the political and others don't or are rejected; why certain ideas, and not others, came to be associated with modern governmentality. The aim, however, is to show the histories of association as well as of disassociation. In the technique of governance called policy, the paper hopes to uncover what Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges,” or ideas that never made it” (into policy) or the nature of conflict between a set of ideas that the unambiguity of the formal policy hides effectively (Foucault 83-4). So the project of uncovering the historical struggles between ideas, with an eye on its implication for policy-making, will provide insights into the process through which the project of colonial governmentality comes to be totalizing in its effects.

The paper will therefore focus on what notions of education and its effects colonial power celebrated or didn't at different times. Through such selections and exclusions, colonial power created a “hierarchy of education.” It will argue also that the process of formalization of education as only this and not that, as only English education promoting the moral development of the illiterate populations mired in prejudice and superstitions, and not “oriental” education that has kept the population backward, is underlined by debates on what is knowledge? How does one create it? How does one kind of education displace another? What are the transformative qualities of this “new” education? So if colonialism is about the colonizer, then this was made possible through a systematic construction of a homogenous, underdeveloped other. And by constructing India as a Hindu land with largely illiterate population and not as undefined territorial spaces inhabited by unenumerated/ unenumerable categories of people with various ways

of being and knowing, that the colonial power came to be itself. But again one must not forget the process through which such hierarchies of knowledges is created, a process marked by contest and conflict, by aggression and retreat, and finally formalizing an idea of change that hides conflictual histories. Thus by deliberately seeking the historical contents of knowledges left by the wayside, within the context of change, can show how an order of knowledge is created and petrified in policy. And finally also highlight how the success of colonial governmentality hinged on this technique called policy with regard to education.

More specifically, this paper examines how the education question, first articulated in the Charter Act of 1813 of the government of England, came to be so articulated, and how within the next two decades and in the Resolution of March 7th 1835 it is answered such that education as a question “disappeared” from discursive field around colonial governmentality in India after 1835, even as concerns around its institutionalization and other questions, like the woman’s question, were articulated and debated. Gauri Viswanathan (1989) has argued that English literature functioned to mask the colonial conquest of India while marking also the ideological superiority of the regime, this paper will show that rather than camouflage colonialism’s material realities, strategies of management of the “unfamiliar” cultural space were born of such realities. It will argue that such was the nature of colonialism that in its need to perpetuate in an “alien” environment it had to posit itself as different yet more benevolent than the previous rulers, the Mughals. Therefore, it engaged in a representational regime—of representing everything about the “unfamiliar” (the colonized) in vocabularies of the familiar (the colonizer) that gave the new power control over knowledge produced thus

and also over using it to engender specific transformations in the social and cultural lives of the colonized that would service the empire and also help legitimize it. Thus the issue of governance also focused on the issue of transformation of the socio-cultural spaces and people who inhabited them and therefore foregrounded more sharply education as a strategy of management. The Charter Act of 1813 and the clause therein on education is testimony to the connection formed between governance and education for the first time in the context of colonialism in India.

The Act also created a discursive field within which the education as a question (its meaning and content) came to be intensely debated before being finally resolved in the Resolution of 1835. If the Charter Act of 1813 declared it lawful for the governor-general in council to set apart a sum of not less than one lakh rupees in each year for the revival and improvement of literature, encouragement of the learned natives, and also to promote the knowledge of sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories, the Resolution of March 7th 1835 was nothing but clear in the meaning of education and the objective of governance. It stated that the “great objective of the British government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India; and that all the funds appropriated for the purpose of education would be best employed on English education alone” (Sharp 1920: 130). More specifically, the paper will look at T.B Macaulay’s Minute on Education (February 2, 1835) but with an eye not only on the ideas/political developments in England at the time that influence the minute but also the opposition to it within the colonial government, specifically and directly by H.H. Prinsep, another member of the Council of Education. It is almost tautological to say that colonial histories, with various theoretic dispositions, have considered the minute as a landmark of

colonial policy on education (Ballhatchet 1951, Spears 1938, Sharp 1920, Muir 1915). In fact it is considered the actual policy on education and the Resolution as its formal attestation. This paper agrees with the characterization yet with the intention to re-examine it in the context of political and economic realities of the empire and its colony and discursive oppositions mounted against it in early and middle nineteenth century. While the paper acknowledges the presence of “indigenous elite” within the discursive field it treats them only as spotlights on the debate on education. The education question was debated largely at the level of the government and either sides of the debate used existing petitions from college students and those prominent in the caste and religious hierarchies to argue their point. In other words, the education question was resolved even as elites as a category, especially in their role as leaders of the masses, was being slowly constructed through the process of debating the question. The elites decisively installed themselves in debates about “their” socio-cultural spaces with the woman question in the latter part of the 19th century but *not* with the education one in mid-nineteenth century.

The paper will therefore focus on the intensity of the debates and knowledge production around the minute in India at the level of the government. It will further show that even in their contentiousness, these debates eventually serviced the policy making project and coalesced into the Resolution of 1835.

The “Problematic” of Education: T.B. Macaulay’s Intervention

The Charter Act of 1813 set aside “10,000 or a lac of rupees” for the “revival and promotion of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and promotion of the knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories” (Trevelyn: p.2). But it was after a decade in 1823 that the question of

education was again revisited and the British parliament again made the first move in this regard. On July 17th the governor-general in council resolved that a general committee of public instruction be established for the purpose of “ascertaining the state of public education, and of public institutions designed for its promotion and of considering, and from time to time submitting to government, the suggestion of such measures as it may appear expedient to adopt with a view to the better instruction of the people, to the introduction among them of useful knowledge and to the improvement of their moral character” (Trevelyn: p.2). While at the beginning of its operations the committee supported the native literature of the “Hindus and the Mohammedans” in the institutions established for these purposes, gradually it began to favor “improving its quality and adding to its value” by first encouraging European superintendence of the colleges and then introducing European maths, geography, and literature into the indigenous curriculum (Trevelyn: p.7). The difference of opinion arose in the committee with regard to the issue of English language as the language of instruction in prominent Hindu and Mohammedan colleges. While one section supported continuing translations of European literary works into Arabic and Sanskrit and of the latter into English, the other section wanted English to replace what were now described as the “vernacular” languages of instruction. They quoted “ruinous expenses” of translations as their reason for favoring English. This issue alone deadlocked the committee for a period of three years and even more sharply foregrounded the issue of education in India. In 1833 the funds allocated to the committee on public instruction were increased from 100,000 to one million rupees and in 1835, T.B. Macaulay came to India to be the new legislative member of the council of India and because of his “high literary reputation” was soon appointed by the

government of India as the president of its council on education (Di Bona: p.9, Sharp: p.133). The increase in the amount of funds for education and the arrival of Macaulay in the midst of the impasse on the issue signaled to the Company that the British legislature was indeed serious about the issue of education in its colony and wanted a quick resolution. Macaulay wasted no time in printing and publishing his Minute on education of the people of India. Infact, he wasted no words in making the case for English language and education. He sums up his 11-page Minute by saying this:

“I think it is clear that we are not fettered by the Act of Parliament of 1813, that we are not fettered by an pledge expressed or implied, that we are free to employ our funds as we choose, that we ought to employ them in teaching what is best worth knowing, that English is better worth knowing than Sanskrit or Arabic, that neither as the languages of law nor as the language of religion have Sanskrit or Arabic any claim to our encouragement, that it is possible to make the natives of this country thoroughly good English scholars, and that to this end our efforts ought to be directed.

...we must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of sciences borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.

...I would strike at the root of the bad system which has hitherto been fostered by us. I would at once stop the printing of Arabic and Sanskrit books. I would abolish the madrasa and the Sanskrit college at Calcutta. ...if we retain the Sanskrit college at Benares and the Mahometan college at Delhi we do enough. ...for the Eastern languages. If the Benares and Delhi colleges were to be retained, I would at least recommend that no stipends be given to any students. ... people should be left to make their own choices between rival systems if education without being bribed by us to learn what they have no desire to know.

I believe that the present system tends not to accelerate the progress of truth but to delay the natural death of expiring errors” (Sharp:p.116)

Macaulay seizes on to the last four lines of the Charter Act of 1813 to argue for his case for English instruction as official colonial policy. He does not find it a “satisfactory interpretation” by others within the Council of India that by “revival and improvement of literatures. . .” the Parliament could have meant only Sanskrit and Arabic; that a learned native couldn’t be the appellation for one who was “familiar with the poetry of Milton, the Metaphysics of Locke, and the Physics of Newton” (Sharp:p.107). Macaulay thereafter takes the last clause “introduction and promotion of knowledge of sciences. . .” as sufficient to authorize all the changes for which he

contends in his Minute. He seemed to be convinced that the dialects spoken by the “natives” were neither literary nor scientific in nature and are “so poor and rude that until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them” (p.109). Therefore the question he poses is: “which language is the best worth knowing?” and also proceeds to answer that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia” (p.109). But such a claim is made with such qualifications as “I have no knowledge of either Sanskrit or Arabic” but “I have read translations of the most celebrated Arabic and Sanskrit works” and “conversed here and at home with men distinguished by their proficiency in the Eastern languages” (p.109). Infact Macaulay’s stringent criticism of Eastern languages is done over the shoulders of the orientalist students from Sanskrit and Arabic institutions because he says that “I have certainly not met with any orientalist who ventured to maintain that the Arabic and Sanskrit poetry could be compared to that of the great European nations” (p.109).

He further refers to a petition by ex-students of Sanskrit college who call into question the usefulness of their ten-twelve years of tuition at the college (p.113). The students seem to find it impossible to find jobs in a shifting political condition and governance with their kind of training. Macaulay seems to attribute this practical impediment, not to the problematic of governance, but to the inadequacy of the indigenous systems of learning. He even uses the petition to state that the students consider “their education as an injury to them. . .that they have wasted the best years of life in learning what procures for them neither bread nor respect” (p.113). Having established, rather dubiously, the cause for non-promotion of the Eastern languages,

Macaulay proceeds to talk about at great length about the “pre-eminence of our own language” (p.110). He speaks of not only the “intrinsic value of the language” but also of its importance to the “particular situation of this country” (of its underdevelopment in the eyes of Macaulay). English, says Macaulay, “stands pre-eminent amongst the languages of the West. . .it abounds in imagination not inferior to the noblest which Greece has bequeathed to us. . .with the most profound speculations in Physics, morals, government, jurisprudence, trade. . .has ready access to all the vast intellectual wealth which all the wisest nations of the world have created and hoarded in the space of ninety years. . .” He then proceeds to say that “in India, English is the language spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of natives at the seats of government. . .it will likely become the language of commerce throughout the seas of the East. . .” (Sharp:p.110).

Macaulay therefore prepares the ideological ground for promotion of English in India and then asks to proceed to address practical concerns for such a policy-change, especially one concerning the power of the government to make this change possible and extensive. Rather than provide concrete ways of making practical what he preached, however, Macaulay continues to cite examples of the civilizing potential of English and what should be done for the sake of the progress of English in India and therefore of the people of India. He believes that the languages of Western Europe “civilized Russia” and cannot doubt that they will do “for the Hindus what they have done for the Tartar” (p.112). He believes it wrong to assume by members of the Council in India that stoppage of stipends to students of Sanskrit and Arabic colleges would raise masses in revolt against the fledgling empire. Infact, says Macaulay, by funding “what the natives themselves nauseate” (instruction in their own languages), “we create the very evil which

we fear. . .we are making the opposition which we do not find” (p.114). Here Macaulay is making the argument that if the students of the native colleges, funded by the government, are dissatisfied with the learning for its impracticality in the real world, then the government is responsible for sponsoring such dissatisfaction. And it will be this dissatisfaction that, Macaulay believes, will raise the banner of protest against the government, before the introduction of English will, as contended by “orientalist” members of the Council. Macaulay’s challenge therefore to the orientalist’s claim that the purpose of the government ought to be the promotion of native languages and forms of instruction, is to show its dangers to the survival of the government itself. He doesn’t think that introduction of English will endanger the government because it is what the natives want, it is what they need to “earn their bread and butter” in the new context and under a new government (p.112). And it is non-recognition of this need, this change in needs regarding instruction and its practical utility by the government, that Macaulay warns, will threaten the stability of the government. Therefore, he posits introduction of English and abolition of all funds to native institutions and literatures across British territories in India as the government-saving policy shift.

Macaulay’s persuasion for English as means and content of instruction in India lies in his unabashed praise for the language and in articulating the possibility of widespread dissatisfaction amongst the elites if English did not replace the native systems of instruction. Maybe this spurred the brevity and clarity of the statement of approval from his superior, governor-general W.C.Bentick: “I give my entire concurrence to the sentiments expressed in this Minute” (Sharp:p.117). Or maybe it is the clear threat of leaving the council that Macaulay issues in the Minute, if his suggestions for a system

overhaul are not considered, that may have prompted haste in its formalization as policy by Bentick. He says that if “it be the opinion of the government that the present system ought to remain unchanged, I beg that I maybe permitted to retire from the chair of the committee” (p.117). Rather than leave to individual conjecture the affirmation of a discursive shift in what should constitute “education” in a policy about it and a more decisive resolution of the problematic of governance in introduction of English across India, it might “behave” us to consider the colonial context within which Macaulay posits education as a question for governmental reconsideration in very certain terms and Bentick approves these terms almost instantly in no more than a line and later in the form of the “resolution of the 7th March 1835.” The resolution agreed to all objections made by Macaulay towards the continuation of indigenous education and decided to—1) use all funds towards promotion of English education only, 2) continue with the existing institutions of oriental learning but stop stipends to students, 3) stop expending of government funds on printing of oriental works, and 4) chart out a plan for imparting English education through English education to the new elite (Sharp: p.130-1).

The Context and Contest for Affirmation

Over time various reasons have been alluded to the fruition of the Resolution of 1835. The resolution, according to F.W. Thomas, was the “most important fact in the history of English education in India,” yet this “important fact” has historically been overshadowed by another “fact”—that its genesis was possible only through Macaulay’s minute on education. Infact, the minute has become the reference point for ensuing debates on education in colonial or post-colonial discursive spaces since it was first published. But its very dominance in the way education was thought in matters of

governance incited its re-examination in interesting ways. Some argued that Macaulay, rather than provide fodder for Bentick's Resolution, only attested to what Bentick had already decided vis-à-vis education for Indians. English education for Indians served Bentick's task of economizing the administration, beset by high pay of the English officials, and also of ejecting Persian as its official language. A formal policy on education would therefore signal a new administration with a different lingual and ideological basis. The only stumbling factor in proceeding with the idea was the legal proposition of the Charter Act of 1813 that also stated that the money allocated for education should be spent on the "revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives" (Muir: 296-7). Macaulay removed the block by shifting the debate from legality to morality; from doing what the legislation of 1813 stipulated to doing what was right or would engender moral improvement of the natives. He undercut therefore the powerful legal basis for the orientalist argument for promotion of existing languages and replaced it with the moral superiority of English education and in the process helped Bentick's agenda to overhaul the administrative system in India. It therefore seems "common sense" that Bentick endorsed the minute as soon as it was published, even though in the formal resolution of 1835, he eschews the aggressive moral tone of the minute and also attesting every point of its emphasis. This also provides an aside into the particular form of the colonial governmentality that begins to emerge therefore through the articulation of policy or intention of governance—that the latter has to mask its religious basis in the language of right and wrong.

Others, however, disagree with the contention that Macaulay only assisted, rather than determine, Bentick agenda through the minute. Instead they refer to the level of

friendship, personal camaraderie, and familial bonds that developed between Bentick and Macaulay upon his arrival in India as the chief propagating factor of the minute, followed by the resolution (Clive 1973). Rather than be concerned about whose motives preceded and therefore became determinants of policy on education, the argument here is for a collaboration that stems from inter-personal liking. When Bentick had received news of Macaulay's appointment as the fourth member of the Governor-general's council in India in 1834, he welcomed it by saying that the "British government was provided with a giant who would be able to conquer both European and native prejudices" (Clive: 294). He was sure that Macaulay would provide the most useful advice in drawing up laws that would be in keeping with the "enlightened spirit of the age" and the laws of England. Macaulay reciprocated the sentiments upon meeting Bentick. He "found the govern-general as he had expected. . .rectitude, openness, and good nature personified" (Clive: 294). Infact Macaulay thought that Bentick was the greatest man he had ever known and even compared him to the monarch, William III (Lady Trevelyan: 60). This kind of effusive personability between the two had to do with something else than chemistry, some others would argue further. The friendship to endure, beyond liking, needed a bedrock of similar ideas regarding the issues of the day, especially as they reflected in the policy on education in India. Both were evangelicals or believed in the creed that placed absolute trust in the power and providence of the Christian God. The creed believed, as did they, that there is but one truth and since truth will make you free, therefore it must be achieved at all costs, even with the help of the sword, where needed (Clive: 13). The "white man's burden" finds its genesis in such a creed and was reflected both in the militaristic creation of India into a British colony in the 17th and the 18th century as well

as in the projects of governance like the one Bentick and Macaulay engaged in the middle of the nineteenth century to legitimize a “truth” (of a Christian government).

The aggressive and castigating stance that Macaulay takes against “oriental education” directly alludes to his evangelical roots and inspiration. However, there have existed disagreements about Bentick’s evangelical leanings. For some like Percival Spears, Bentick exemplified the Benthamite principles of utilitarianism in his attitudes to administration in India but for others like John Roselli, also the most recent biographer of Bentick, the roots of his reforming zeal were more evangelical than utilitarian. Even though his favorite motto, “the happiness and improvement of the condition of the people,” echoed the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, its practice was decidedly Christian and in the mode previously associated with the missionary work in the 18th century in India. His insistence on legally abolishing the practice of widow burning and female infanticide was similar in nature to the proselytizing zeal of the erstwhile Christian missionaries. In other words, the Christian zeal to reform Hindu religion that the East India Company officials eschewed in the 18th century came to inform and mark colonial governmentality in the mid-19th century. Bentick had been recalled as the governor of Madras in 1807 because the directors of the Company held him responsible for the outbreak of the Vellore mutiny (Clive: 317). Directors believed that Bentick’s insistence that the “sepoys” of the regiment change their habits of dress and hygiene resulted in upsetting their religious codes of conduct. Yet the same William Bentick was called back to India and appointed as the governor-general of Bengal in 1828. But now he could garb his evangelical alignments in his utilitarian vocabulary that appealed not only to his superiors but also to the native elite, whose

opinions on matters concerning their religion and their women were elicited when required for purposes of legitimacy of decisions. His proposed legislative action against widow burning and infanticide in 1838 , for example, was preceded by the following reassurance: “my primary object is the benefit of the Hindus. I know nothing so important to the improvement of their future condition as the establishment of a purer morality. . .” (Muir: 295). He says further, “I disown in these remarks any view whatever to conversion of our own faith. . . I write and feel as a legislator for the Hindus and as I believe most enlightened Hindus think and feel” (Muir: 295). Here Bentick uses the logic of humanism that was exemplified in the utilitarian philosophy to justify governmental intervention in social-cultural life of the natives. The intervention is premised on the separation between the art of governance and evangelical drive of the erstwhile Christian missionaries in India yet in fact it is not. The language of governance as humanistic in spirit effectively hides how much the project of governance borrows from the proselytizing projects of the Christian missionaries, especially the latter’s emphasis on knowledge production about the other yet through their participation and for the singular purpose of their conversion. Therefore, Bentick could be aroused towards reformist zeal by such evangelical civil servants as Charles Trevelyn, also later to be Macaulay’s brother-in-law, but still couch his formal statements on reform in humanistic and universal terms (Clive: 318). He allowed Macaulay’s evangelical passion to pour out in the form of eulogy to English education in the minute yet was able to create a resolution that endorsed it in spirit but not in its language. Therefore one can only reiterate what Trevelyn says about Bentick that “he was an evangelical as well as of the improving party” (Clive: 318).

Percival Spears however is dissatisfied with the explanation that personal relations and similarity in political ideas regarding reform in the empire explains the fact of the Resolution of 1835. Instead he makes context as an important determinant of affiliations and their reflection in practice. In other words, he says that to understand either the minute or the resolution “it is to England rather than India that we must look for decisive change-over in Indian education policy” (Spears: 224). Rather than debate the evangelical or utilitarian moorings of Bentick, Macaulay, or even Trevelyn to understand how the education policy in India came to be, Spears prefers to call the trio conduits of the utilitarian and evangelical movements in England at the time. By the time of Bentick’s appointment as the governor-general of Bengal (1828) and in the administration of Lord Grey in England, two streams of thought prevailed. The Utilitarian influence was exercised by James Mill and the Evangelical influence was exercised through the Grants (Spears: 83-4). While Mill was of the view that the “great end of the government should not be to teach Hindu or Mahommedan learning but useful learning,” the Grants were pushing for English education in the colony along the lines first suggested by Charles Grant in 1792. Charles Grant had proposed to the Court of Directors of the Company then that English was the “most effective weapon to undermine the Hindu fabric of error,” that English would enable the Hindus to see reason and to obtain “new and better views of their duty as rational and Christian creatures” (Embree: 154). By 1830 the line that separated Mill’s argument for useful knowledge from Grants’ argument for English education for the natives blurred in the articulations of the Company directors. In their mind and their dialogue with each other, English became that useful knowledge that would reform the other. This equation between erstwhile

divergent ideas was carried into colonial space by William Bentick in 1828 and by Macaulay in 1834. Governance could now accommodate both or either ideologies without necessarily explaining either in the context of policy-making. Even though Spears makes allusions to the above, it is enough to further flesh out and understand the contextual basis of the colonial policy on education in the nineteenth century, whether that policy is the resolution or the minute or both.

Spears gives us an important way to rethink the genesis of the education policy but his treatment of context as a two-variable matrix rather than as a cascade of inter-meshing ideas and events in multiple locations leaves the details unexplored. There is no disagreeing about the fact that in nineteenth century England ideas about India were changing and these came to bear in policy-making in India. But what was inducing such a change in ideas? What were the political and cultural projects in and about England at the time concern about India shifted and focused on education of the natives as never before? In other words, we need to ask a different question that seeks its answer not only in the material context of the other but also of the material and ideological context of the self. If the self needs the other to exist then it also needs to transform the other to recast itself and emerge anew. This move to detail the specifics of the socio-political context of England to understand the genesis of thought on education as a strategy to manage the colonial populations also fulfills a theoretical agenda: to provincialize the West or Europe (Chakrabarty: 20). By introducing history of Britain as the backdrop to educational interventions in India allows us to bring to the forefront what is effectively hidden in the process of exercising power in totality; to spotlight particular political dilemmas that miraculously transformed into powerful notions of rights and citizenship, for example,

through experimentation in the colonial laboratory. In other words, it allows us to observe how and why citizenship rights, not accorded to particular Catholic minorities till the mid-nineteenth century, became ideological weapons to critique colonial “traditions” at the same time. Therefore it is important to focus also on the socio-cultural developments in England in the mid-nineteenth century that generated particular ideas and debates about reorganizing social spaces through particular strategies, which then came to reflect in and be practiced in the context of the empire and its particular issues of governance. While this paper does not move into such contextual details, it does examine policy as a process and the contentiousness of such a process within the state departments. There wasn’t a single strain of ideological and political development that affected everyone the same. There were different strains of thought impinging on the minds of those who were engaged in the art of governance and therefore contentions regarding how such an art may be exercised in the jewel in the crown of the empire. This paper then looks at one such debate regarding the appropriateness of transforming Macaulay’s minute into a formal policy on education in colonial India.

The Battle of Ideas: T.B. Macaulay vs H.W. Prinsep

It is the discursive battle on the issue of English instruction of the natives, between the Council president, T.B. Macaulay and Council Secretary, H. Prinsep that actually allows us to make the claim that policy is a process that is contentious, even as its formal statement of intention is precise and unambiguous. On March 7th March 1835, the following resolution was issued by the Governor General Lord William Bentick: “His Lordship in Council is of the opinion that the great object of the government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science amongst the natives of India; and that

all the funds appropriated for the purpose of education should be employed on English education alone” (Camerons: 81-82). This resolution is arrived at after considering two contesting minutes/notes by T.B. Macaulay and the Secretary of the Committee on Public Instruction H.T. Prinsep. The resolution, one would think, represents a consensus on the issue of the content of education for the native population in India. In its unambiguity, however, Bentick’s resolution is more in concurrence with Macaulay’s articulations on the necessity to “from a class a persons Indian in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (Sharp: 116). The question that remains is how such discursive clarity emerges in the face of contesting arguments, especially those articulated by H.T. Prinsep. Prinsep, in his concern with Macaulay’s insistence on funding only English education of the natives, provides a rather structured and rigorous counter-argument to each “fact” that Macaulay presents to make his case. For example, Macaulay argues that the “revival of native literature can be best effected by abolishing all institutions for teaching the literature that then existed and that had existed for ages before and by communicating instruction only in English” (p.118). To this rather circuitous way of arguing that “native” literature too is in need of “modernization” and that critical to that process of modernization is mediation of its meanings through English, Prinsep has a rather contextual and legal response. To him Macaulay’s contention contravenes a legal Act of the Act 53 Geo III, which intended to encourage and promote the native literature of India. To Prinsep it is clear that the Act’s emphasis on the “revival and promotion of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives,” *did not* mean to “refer to any other literature than native literature not to any other learned natives than such as were eminent by their proficiency in that literature”

(p.118). He also reiterates that this was what the Act intended then and should not be “forced out of their natural construction” to mean anything different. In other words, he takes objection to Macaulay’s interpretation of “revival and promotion of literature” as English literature and “encouragement of learned natives” as encouraging the natives to learn English and translate “native” literature into English. Even though Prinsep’s intention is to keep his note short and to “merely point out where in the minute before the government the opposite view has not been fully stated or where the information built upon is incomplete and incorrect,” his response to Macaulay is very detailed and meant to critique every point that offers a change in government sponsorship of “native literature” or even the way the term “literature” is defined. Both Macaulay and Prinsep claim to “neither pursuits, inclinations, and acquaintance” with “oriental literature” yet both seem to be locked in a battle over its meanings and representations, even how it may be funded or not. Prinsep believes that the real intention of Macaulay’s minute was to discourage teaching of Arabic and Sanskrit by natives to natives. For Macaulay the “teaching of Arabic and Sanskrit was not consulting the intellectual taste of the natives but forcing on them the mock learning which they nauseate” (Macaulay: p.112). This, to him, “this is proved by the fact that we pay our Arabic and Sanskrit students while those who learn English pay us. . . we cannot find in our vast empire a single student who will let us teach him those dialects unless we will pay him” (p.112). Macaulay’s assertions are supported by the report on the Calcutta madarasa where in December 1833, 77 Arabic students in the foundation were receiving in the aggregate above Rs. 500 per month, while the English master received Rs.103 from students who wanted to learn English (p.123). Yet Prinsep still sees no ground to believe that the “great body of Mooslims” did not want to

venerate their own language and literature or that the Hindus as a body were not partial to Sanskrit. And therefore there is, to him, no ground to argue like Macaulay does, that natives abhor their own languages and would rather read/study English, a language that Macaulay calls the “gateway to science and reason.” Prinsep fails to see why the monthly allowances given at the madrasa and in the Sanskrit colleges are any different from the scholarships of the universities or the foundation of scholars of the public schools of England or are any less competitive or meant to induce greater competition amongst the applicants. Prinsep’s greater astonishment is regarding the confusion that Macaulay creates between two terms “scholarship” and “payment” (to study). Why a general understanding of scholarship as a reward for successful completion of studies or a successful beginning of the process should be construed to mean “payment” to fill in seats at the foundations of studies, is Prinsep’s dilemma and his critique of Macaulay’s minute.

Prinsep also finds fault with the basis of the argument—that payment for studies is the reason for nausea against it. For Prinsep, there is no assurance that the absence of “payment” would be a bigger test of what inspires and fires people’s imaginations and their will to approach higher learning (p.123). Prinsep turns Macaulay’s argument on the head when he points out that even in the Madarasa, a scholarship had been established to encourage the study of English. So maybe it should not have been, if one agrees with Macaulay that payment for studies only creates in people an aversion towards it. Prinsep presses on by further arguing that it was only in the case of English instruction that teachers were paid for their services. Contrarily, the Hindu and Muslim scholars did not ask nor were paid voluntarily for their services because this was not an accepted or

practiced tradition. Yet there were more students enrolled in the learning for Sanskrit and Persian than for English, where for the latter the student progress has not been beyond the “spelling book” (p.124). And if the demand for English was indeed as great as Macaulay, would have us believe, then why English needed to be made a compulsory subject in schools (rather than a voluntary/violent demand) seems a bit illogical to Prinsep. Without denying the “widespread anxiety for the attainment of a certain proficiency in English (amongst the natives)” and the need for this “sentiment to be encouraged by all means as the source and forerunner of great moral improvement to those who feel its influence” Prinsep is doubtful about asserting that such an anxiety and need has indeed manifested itself strongly amongst the Muslims, even if the Hindus knew and promoted the language for their own sake or rather for the sake of their livelihood within a new political and institutional setup (p.124-5). While he asserted the critical and strategic importance of constructing and gaining the acceptance of Muslims in the introduction of English as a means of instruction and as instruction itself, he also declined to accept as conclusive, a petition by “certain students of the Sanskrit college” that “their own studies (of Sanskrit) did not assure them an assured or easy livelihood” (p.125). To Prinsep such a petition “affords no evidence that the knowledge they have acquired is useless” as claimed to the contrary by the minute (p.125). In demanding “much research and patient investigation” to determine the nature of the dilemma that the native youth faced vis-à-vis the direction of their lives, Prinsep also critiques the subjective nature of the minute. Instead of exploring in detail and rigorously the question of education in conjunction with the dilemmas of the youth within political transience, the minute, for Prinsep, is Macaulay’s eulogy to English within a lingual and cultural diversity and with varying commitments

to this diversity. Infact Prinsep here wants to refocus on the crux of the argument of the minute—that it is “by encouraging the study of native literature . . . opposition to the study of English and of true science” is promoted (p.125). Macaulay is convinced and tries to convince that only in violently ejecting the existent notions of erudition and erudite learning and literature that one can finally remove the opposition to English and Science. To Prinsep this line of argument first assumes that the scholars of Sanskrit and Persian are necessarily opposed to the new or to English in this instance and second, reconciliation between the two is an impossibility (p.126). This contention, however, directly contravenes another, that “all the world is anxiously seeking the new and attaches no value to the old” (p.126). Prinsep, therefore, is concerned with the contending nature of the two arguments—if the “native” population is not attached to its own systems of learning, as per Macaulay, and is only seeking the new, then how can they also be the principal hindrance to the introduction of English language and literature? Prinsep, on the other hand, accounts not only for the discontent amongst particular sections of the society and between communities regarding English, but also recognizes, in support of his views, an extensive and indigenous system of learning that has its own complex histories of origin and continuance that can be understood thus through time and through series of research initiatives. Yet in proposing that “true knowledge” is but an engrafting of English over that knowledge held in esteem by the natives gradually so that both can be subject of admiration in their reconciliation, Prinsep may diverge only marginally from Macaulay. Macaulay may be promoting a violent or rather sudden replacement of existing knowledge by English, yet Prinsep is only delaying such a process by making the transition to English slow and an engrafted experience. In other words, the violence

doesn't derive its effect from the suddenness of the transition, for it is not also mitigated in its slowness, as Prinsep would like us to believe. Through the course of his critique against Macaulay, Prinsep slowly begins to agree with Macaulay and never more so than regarding the issue of expenditure upon printing and translating of native literature. Macaulay argues that translations from Arabic and Sanskrit sponsored by the Committee on instruction did not sell is proof enough of the natives' distaste for their own literature. Instead of directly engaging with this rationale to show that native literature was not worth either the attention of the government nor of the natives themselves, Prinsep, instead, agrees with the contention. He says, "I fear it must be admitted that very considerable sums have been thrown away upon works which have yielded no fruit. The translations have been the most expensive and least profitable of these works, for they have been executed at very enormous rates of charge and in a style for the most part not popular and taking" (p.126). He also agrees and asserts that only that literature ought to be revived that would pay and what does pay need not be funded through government but left to the logic of the market or forces of demand and supply. However, Prinsep does make an important observation that just because printing and translation has not been profitable for the Committee on Instruction and for the colonial government, one cannot speculate that this is due to local nausea for their own knowledge. Instead one could speculate on the ways in which the translations have been conducted and the prices at which books about what is known orally or located in the learned men and women of the community are being sold. To Prinsep this may account for "their (the books) not being taken off our hands" (p.127). On the other hand, the reason for why English books have

been popular has to do private sponsorship, growing number of Christian population interested in these texts, and consistent government support to even these private efforts.

Prinsep is also concerned that Macaulay gives only half the story as he forgets to mention the thriving business of printing in Persian and Arabic literature, almost in the same degree as that of the English press (p.127). He says that “we see establishments for printing Persian and Arabic books as thriving as the English presses and numberless books and little treatises are issued from them of which hear nothing” (p.127). Prinsep therefore appeals to his audience to examine the grounds therefore on which “so startling a proposition is advanced and maintained” and why no attempt is made to uncover facts that in some way or the other contravene the position that Macaulay insists on adhering to (p.122). But Macaulay’s minute doesn’t end at hiding evidence about the success of local press and local knowledge vis-à-vis English. The minute also argues that “it cannot be necessary to keep up instruction in Arabic and Sanskrit because of the connection of these languages with the religion of Hindus and Muslims” (p.127). To Prinsep this is strange for he “never heard this reason assigned as an argument for a Christian Government’s continuing to give the instruction” (p.127). Prinsep, here, not only shows us the subjective and particular nature of Macaulay’s argument for English against Arabic and Sanskrit, but also its very religious underpinnings. Further, he points out that if Macaulay’s favoring of English and literature is wrapped up in his Christian belief, then why it becomes necessary to highlight the specific veneration of Arabic and Sanskrit by the particular communities because of the religious basis of these languages and literatures is still curious. Finally, if we must argue that local languages and people are wrapped up in their religion, then this is inconsistent with Macaulay’s earlier idea that

locally there exists wide-spread nausea against one's own ways of being and communicating (p.128).

Post-dissection of each idea and its consistency with the other in Macaulay's minute, Prinsep finally makes his own appeal. He admits to the importance and need to "endeavor to carry the people with us in all we seek to do for their improvement. . ." and to consider all necessary means of doing so rather than submit to grand propositions of the abolition of the Madarasa and the Sanskrit college at Calcutta and the alteration of the character of all other institutions supported or assisted from the public funds. Prinsep sees great harm in such propositions because if local institutions of learning are demolished through cessation of funding to them, the government would no longer have the pulse of the local youth. Prinsep also argues against the cessation of funding because, for him, there is no legal basis to this. If the local institutions thrived under private endowment, one established separately from the government and even before the issue of state funding for education of youth in colonies was considered, then to abolish it needs deeper and more extensive discussions between the members of the Committee on Instruction and the learned members of the institutions rather than the whim of an individual. Prinsep, however, is more concerned about the social consequences of a hurried and non-discursive mode of instituting change locally, whether it is in the form of abolition of the Madarasa or the engrafting of English on local forms of learning. He is concerned about the possibility of alienating particular communities like the Muslims, who, he thinks, "are more jealous of innovation upon their habits and their habits, than the Hindus ever were" (p.129). Therefore, to Prinsep, it is of critical importance that the government suspend judgement on the best way to educate the people of India till the government hears all of

the opposing arguments to the minute presented by Macaulay. He doesn't think that engrafting English and degrafting of the local learning processes without adequate problematizing of the issue of education and of the "unfamiliar" was at all in the interest of a government attempting to extend its domain of influence and control.

Prinsep's interjections to Macaulay's minute are important not only for their reflections on education as a modern technique of governance but also marks the disagreements and ruptures that characterize the understanding of education in a colonial context. Yet it is Prinsep's diary and his personal reflections on the circumstances that led to the minute and to its formalization into the official policy on education by the colonial government soon after, provide us insights into not only the discursive nature of policy but also its formalization as a contingent rather than a consistently logical process, even though the clarity of the policy's final statement would make us believe otherwise. The diary, as part of the autobiographical sketch of Prinsep, also shows personal and ideological tensions chronologically between different government officials regarding the education question and how abruptly and, through an decision arrived almost and seemingly contrary to the logic and the length of the debate, the question is answered. Let's examine the following ruminations from Prinsep's diary on the "government measures for the promotion of education amongst the natives" (p.132). It is a rather extensive paragraph but highlights quite well the contingent nature of policy in its processual form.

When I retook my place in the Council of Education after my return from Tasmania, and I found there a contest to be raging whether in the Calcutta Madrasa and other institutions maintained by the government, English should be preferentially taught and the study of that language made obligatory on all or as hitherto to be left optional under the inducement of the benefit in after life which the knowledge of it will confer. I took part *ofcourse* against the innovations which this party wanted to introduce and I carried with me the vote of the majority of the council of education. But when T.B. Macaulay arrived to be the new legislative member of the council of India, his high literacy reputation induced the government to appoint him President of the Council of Education,

and the English party, as it was called, entertained high hope that his influence and authority would turn the scale against me and my supporters. He was a mere silent observer, however, for some time, *until* Lord William Bentick had resumed his place at the seat of government, *then one day without mooted the matter at all in the Council of Education, he prepared an elaborate Minute proposing not only to withhold any further grant of public money from institutions for conferring instruction in native literature of any kind, but even to abolish the existing Sanskrit and Madrassa dating from the time of Warren Hastings.*

This Minute T.B. Macaulay gave to Lord William Bentick at Barrackpur, the Governor General's country house. Lord William sent it down to me (the Educational being one of my Secretariat departments) with a short note written at the foot adopting it and desiring it to be put in train to be brought before the council. I accordingly circulated it in a box in the usual form. *The box was returned to me without a note or memorandum of any kind from any of the members.* I accordingly considered it my duty to prepare and circulate a memorandum explaining the nature of the institutions proposed to be established, and giving reasons why they should hesitate to adopt the extreme views propounded by Mr. Macaulay. This memorandum I sent up to the governor general and it was afterwards circulated to the members of the council from it elicited separate short minutes of their opinions. These discussions of course were confidential and were by me communicated to nobody. But somehow the report got wind that the government was about to abolish the Madrassa and Sanskrit colleges. The mind of the public of Calcutta was immediately in a ferment. In three days a petition was signed by no less than 30,000 people in behalf of the Madrassa and another by the Hindus for the Sanskrit College. T.B. Macaulay got it into his head that this agitation was excited and even got up by me. He sent for the head of the Madrassa. . . and questioned him upon the subject, using for interpretation John Colvin, a junior civil servant and of the party opposed to me. He particularly asked him whether he had obtained from me or from my office the knowledge of it being the intention of the government to do anything with the Madrassa. The Hafiz. . . replied in the negative. After his examination, he came to tell me what had passed. . . when he told me about John Colvin. . . he had been at Barrackpur when T.B. Macaulay presented his Minute to Lord William, and there learning that it had been adopted had come back elated at the triumph of this party, and could not help boasting it to the people of the college. . . When the subject came under consideration in Council, there was a very hot debate between myself and Mr. Macaulay. . . *Lord William Bentick would not even allow my memorandum to be placed on record.* He said it was quite an abuse that secretaries should take upon themselves to write memorandums; that it was enough for the Court of Directors to see what the Members of the Council chose to place on record; that what the secretaries wrote was nothing unless adopted by the government. *Thus ended this matter for the time.* The Resolution passed on this occasion was modified afterwards and made a little more favorable for the old native institutions by Lord Auckland but English had ever since been the study preferentially encouraged by government in connection with vernacular literature. The study of Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian is in consequence less cultivated than heretofore but none of the old institutions have been altogether abolished. (p.133-4).

This tract says two things in particular: one, Prinsep's personal and professional antipathy towards Macaulay, especially the identity of interests and opinions between Macaulay and the then governor general Lord William Bentick that, to Prinsep, was the reason why English language and literature formally replaced local knowledges in schools and colleges in colonial India in the 1830s; two, while protesting the contingent nature of policy making or how suddenly political decisions on a particular idea was made irrespective of the opposing arguments, Prinsep provides a rather detailed explication of

the discursive nature of political decision-making. Yet wants more discussion on the subject rather than leave it to the ideologies of a particular person because of the consequences it may entail. Therefore Prinsep is not protesting the discursive nature of policy-making and governance. Infact he is implicated in a rather extensive discussion with Macaulay and others in the education council over why an English education was not feasible their colonial subjects, even though these discussions are more through letters than in person. To Macaulay's insistence on the imperative of anglicizing a population, Prinsep threw more caution because of the underprepared and unknown social terrain for such an intervention to be welcomed and absorbed. Prinsep is reluctant to institute a policy that had seemed to have every possibility of fomenting fermentation amongst a population that had initially received patronage for its own language and literatures from individual British governors and generals yet would be denied the same while being forced to acknowledge the arrival of the English. Prinsep, therefore, in his opposition to Macaulay's minute on education was also making a case for modernity of governance. He is trying to show that British governance in India cannot and should neither be a collusion between powerful yet biased political interests nor should it be based on the rhetoric of change that does not consider the political and economic consequences of such the change suggested, especially when the idea of change is not based on extensive knowledge and understanding of the social terrain on which it is to be engrafted. Such considerations, he drives home the point, need extensive discussion.

Prinsep is also here calling into sharp focus the object of modern governance, as identified by Foucault,—the population. He is pre-empting an opposing reaction to Macaulay's minute for its suddenness in replacing the patronized local systems of

education by English literature and its ill-consideration of the political and governance motives for the patronage to have existed before. And the preemption, for Prinsep, is based on the Minute's claim to know the "hearts and minds of the Indians" and their favoring of English to their own indigenous systems of knowledge without even considering ethnographies of the state of education in northern India by like William Adam, contemporary of both Prinsep and Macaulay. Prinsep attempts to show how Macaulay fails to contribute to the modern governance in his hastiness to impose an idea and system; he spares no time or thought to the need to deliberate or problematize education in the colonial context. To Prinsep the Minute is therefore a good example of how both the object of governance and the project of modernity are undermined. The debate between Macaulay and Prinsep may also be perceived as a debate between the classical and Anglo-Scottish school of liberal thought in Europe, especially as even these streams of political rationalities struggled to accommodate the truths about imperialism and its rapacious nature. While Macaulay seems to represent classical liberalism or early liberalism in his need to protect British economic interests in the sub-continent while exercising an unlimited exercise of political sovereignty, Prinsep represents its critique. Prinsep, in calling Macaulay's resolution as a "hostile declaration against the literature of the country inconsistent with the past and with recent professions of the government. . . ." (Sharp:135) is implying a criticism of the characteristic form of government in the early modern period, persisting in the minds of particular political players like Macaulay even in the 19th century, which Foucault describes as the "police state" associated with *raison d'etat*. The assumption of *raison d'etat* was that the state was able to have an adequate and detailed knowledge of what had to be governed and on the basis of which it could act

to direct and shape reality in accordance with its, the state's own interests like increasing its wealth and military strength either against other states (Burchell: 22). Yet this is precisely liberalism's critique of the state and its claim to knowledge of the governable social terrain that Prinsep's comments on Macaulay's minute have foregrounded. He is echoing what Foucault has called the "decisive point of liberalism's critique of the state and its reason. . . or of the state's ability to know perfectly and in all details the reality to be governed and also its capacity to shape this reality at will on the basis of such knowledge" (Burchell:22). But it is important to note here that Prinsep, in echoing the Anglo-Scottish liberal thought of setting limits to the state's capacity to know and act by situating it in relation to the reality of the market and the commercial exchanges and of regarding the social space as quasi-natural domains with their own intrinsic dynamic and forms of self-regulation, is specifically concerned with the limits of intervention by a colonial government in matters of an "unfamiliar" yet superficially known social. He is concerned that without a detailed knowledge of the social, it is politically and economically deleterious of a formative colonial administration to attempt or be confident of altering the same as per the familiar or England. He is concerned therefore with Macaulay's lack of political sagacity in suggesting a social engineering in the colony that is based primarily on the arrogance rather than researched data-base of knowledge or discussion on facets of policy. So Prinsep, in the colonial context, is not questioning the state's ability to know but rather the claim to knowledge without operable methodologies to create such knowledge on the basis of which political decisions may be made. Prinsep is therefore requesting that rules of liberalism are to be accommodated differently in the colonial context; that the state actually must know about the unfamiliar

before it makes a claim to understanding it and also to change it and that knowing the unfamiliar is critical to its ability to govern and to rationalize for its practices. And for this reason, Prinsep wants a more reflected way of thinking not only about Macaulay's Minute amongst the colonial administrators but also by the government as a whole vis-à-vis the colony.

Prinsep and Macaulay debate on the issue of education of the people of India also foregrounds the debate within liberalism in its colonial setting—of the kind of state or governance necessitated here. Macaulay was convinced of the importance of inserting a paternal directive to the colonial subjects of the necessity of their own transformation through an English education. He was insisting thereby a paternal state in the colonial setting that not only claimed to know about its subjects but also the techniques of their subjectification and transformation. Prinsep, however, was less convinced of this “new state,” and in its ability to know fully about who and what it wanted to transform for its own sake. Instead he wanted a continuation of the *lassize faire* character of the governance even in its colonial setting rather than of attempting an effective project of social engineering amongst a population it was encountering in its complete complexity. Prinsep's suggestion is important not for its similarity with the liberal thought of setting limits to state sovereignty and its arrogance of knowing everything about the social, but for his own confusion and trepidation about replicating a particular kind of governance in an unfamiliar setting, especially when this unfamiliar was experiencing an intrusion in its ways of life and living that was potentially disrupting and rapacious. The liberal knowledge that society comprises of free individuals making individual choices about their social and economic well-being is put to test in a colonial setting. The knowledge is

also critiqued by the very nature of the empire—colonizing “new” populations and lands for the singular purpose of building its economic and military might versus other empires. The fundamental principles of liberalism as “committed to securing individual liberty and human dignity through a political cast that typically involves democratic and representative institutions, the guaranty of individual rights of property, and freedom of expression, association, and conscience. . .” however were severely tested in the context of colonization of people and denying them basic human rights (Singh:3). Yet the test did not result in the death of liberalism but provided the ground rather for its legitimation as a particular political philosophy that, however, could be universally replicated through the operationalization of particular techniques of subjectification. The coercive and paternalistic state in the colonial context was thus justified even as its *lassiez faire* character was insisted on in the western context. Macaulay was thus convinced but Prinsep was trepiditious of the consequences of such an assertive and intrusive state and its techniques of transforming the colonial setting to assist in this project. But the seeming divergence between Macaulay and Prinsep’s thoughts on the operationalization of liberal ideas in the governance of an “alien race” stems not from a different understanding of liberalism and its influence on the nature of governance but of the preparedness of the object domain (the social) to be governed through particular techniques. There is no disagreement between the two regarding the social as the problem-space of the government and that this space is open-ended space of real politico-technical invention of a governmental constructivism. Yet both are also simultaneously debating or attempting to fix an answer to the question of how political sovereignty must be exercised in a new environment where the object-domain is not constitutive of familiar

forms of self-government or patterns of sociability or what relationship must political sovereignty establish with the quasi-natural reality over which it must preside but with which it may not do what it likes (again, not because of its internal dynamism but because of lack of knowledge of what may this dynamism be). The debate between the two is also about techniques of a liberal art of government in a colonial environment; what techniques, procedures, regulations, laws would become suitable for the transformation of this reality in accordance with particular goals of increasing production and wealth.

However, like William Adam's ethnographies¹ were peppered by instances of his own bias against the usefulness of the diverse nature and content of indigenous education, similarly, Prinsep's insistence on discussion was undermined by his own conviction in the transformative potential of English education as opposed to the indigenous one. Both Adam and Prinsep, even in their opposition to promoting English education of the natives due to considerations of appropriateness of time and lack of enough discussion on the subject, infact became its supporters. William Bentick's official Resolution of 1835 made promotion of English education as colonial government's principal aim.

¹ William Adam was the editor and co-owner of the Calcutta Chronicle in 1827. He wrote against government policies like the Calcutta Stamp Act and questioned general assumptions about the Indian population as "illiterate and uncivilized" (Sanil: 61). He inserted himself in the debates on the education question in 1835 and was also commissioned by Lord William Bentick to look into the indigenous forms of education and their practicability in the changing political environment and necessities. His detailed observations of the education systems in parts of rural India can be termed ethnographic material for their visual portrayal of the landscape of education prior to colonial insertion. It can be argued that the complex nature of Adam's ethnographies, that typify no particular class, caste, or religion, instead show the nature of social interaction and co-existence between them, were seen as lacking clarity and focus of purpose. Opposed to such empirical detail, Macaulay's minute, based on largely his elementary and subjective observations of the "natives" and their means of education, was foregrounded as decisive and forceful. Such a notion of clarity that is based on the simplicity of the rhetoric rather than its research-based content later defined the nature of policy-making in colonial as well as post-colonial India.

Conclusion

The resolution of the education question in 1835 resolved the problematic of governmentality that had plagued the Company and the British parliament since the 18th century. With clarity on the meaning of education emerged the clarity on how best to govern in the colonial space without fear or favor. Once English was marked as an instrument of self-governability and self-improvement and an indigenous elite created to refer to and participate in the making and dissemination of such a contention, education's importance was no longer a question that could broker intense debates around its possible answers. The Charter Act of 1813 had made promotion of education as the imperative and goal of the colonial government yet also engendered therein controversies around its specific meaning. Therefore, education became a way of thinking about governance and shaped the emergence of governmentality in the colonial context.

The Resolution of 1835 further showed that fixing meanings of terms like education and making specific their content and application was also the end of governmentality because governance required clarity to be convincing in its purpose. If the education question produced debates about it, then these debates also produced sets of competing knowledges divided into such categories as "indigenous education" and "western education." And government, that chose English over Arabic, for example, as the content of education for its colonial subjects, could refer to the sets of knowledges within which English and Arabic could be located and explained from and thereby claim to be making an informed choice about governance. Therefore, governance explained was governance legitimized. The Resolution of 1835 then did two things: one, it closed the debate, at the level of the government, on the meaning and importance of education in

the colonial context, and two, it marked the emergence of governmentality, especially as a discursive process, but a process central to the art of governance. Post-1835 then education was not debated as it was till 1835. As a question posed in a particular way in 1813 and then answered accordingly in 1835, education ceased to be a matter of passionate debate for the colonial government in the late nineteenth century. What education does and can do (self-improvement) continued to be reasserted in various ways after 1835, especially in the form of more institutions of English education (schools and universities), but with the understanding that education meant western education taught in English. Now the issue for debate within the colonial government was additional English schools and changes in the English curriculum or even its formalization and not whether English was appropriate to teach (Basu: 25). The government was established as the primary source of knowledge production that would service policy as well as its principal funder. And its preferred method for both was quantitative in nature rather than qualitative. Adam's ethnographic method of inquiry was abandoned in favor of numbers sorted as tables of data. Commissions of inquiry set up by the government from time to time since the later nineteenth century were meant to collect numbers on students in schools, for example, rather than collect interviews on what seemed unsatisfactory to people in terms of new changes in education. Education therefore ceased to be a dilemma post-1835. This was also because the same government that authored the resolution of the education question in 1835 was also one to author yet another question—the woman's question. This shifted attention, therefore, to another problematic of governmentality and to another process for its resolution; one that would take a different trajectory and because of different reasons.

It is important to point out that the vesting of the authority regarding the new class in the Brahmins, and their claim to ownership of all questions and answers regarding the imagined community, was opposed by an emerging low-caste movement in the latter part of the nineteenth century. But resistance may be opposition that creatively assimilates or modifies what it is opposed or the imposed structures of dominance (Dhareshwar: 214). Mahatma Phule in Maharashtra, for example, mounted a stringent critique of the Brahmins and their control over access to resources, material and cultural, through the creative use of the woman question. In 1863, he set up the “home for the prevention of infanticide” where high caste widows could come and give birth in secret and return to their previous homes in secret (O’Hanlon: 135). The existence of such a space undermined not only the Brahmanical authority over defining the conduct of Hindu women, it also referenced the possibility of a cohesive low caste community and movement through such a strategy. In the battle for ideological leadership, Phule also failed to see the British as the source of reconstituted power of the Brahmins. Instead the English were seen as “god sent,” “whose singular purpose was to lift the ban on education which the Brahmans have imposed on the “shudras” and the “ati-shudras,” to educate them and make them wise” (O’Hanlon: 129). Phule felt that the introduction of the East India company represented a unique opportunity for the lower castes, especially in terms of education. He regarded western education, with its emphasis on “secular and rationalists truths about the external world,” as the most effective weapon for the liberation of the lower castes from the Brahmans (O’Hanlon: 126). Such a characterization of the government as benevolent and fair was born of the available work of the Christian missionaries with the lower-castes and their critique of the Brahmanical

superiority and made the two synonymous with each other. In other words, the low caste critique of caste as an iniquitous, hierarchical system drew its force from missionary work within such communities yet, most importantly, also served the genesis of the term “Christian government” and of its characterization as “well-disposed” and “well-meaning” to the plight of the underprivileged. Therefore, it is easy surmise here that the low-caste leadership and movement was formed in the same way that the Brahmanical leadership of the Hindu community was asserted against the religious other, the Muslims. Yet the articulations were not made to their own but to an external power, the British, who were now seen as the decision-makers or those with the power to intervene actively in the aspects of Indian social and cultural life. So the presence of the British and statements of intention about “India” instituted new leaders and their new processes of identity-formation as well as of homogenization/heterogenization of communities along the axes of caste and religion. The presence and the intention of the British was not questioned but valorized for its potential to engender necessary changes in “traditional Indian society” by the late-nineteenth century.

For the purposes of this paper, what is even more striking is the fact that both Brahmins and the low caste movement equated education with western education, which is also now cited as the remedy for the “material and intellectual impoverishment of the Indian society” or the “key to fundamental change in social attitudes” (O’Hanlon: 118). For the low caste leadership, particularly, western education not only held the key to intellectual liberation but also socio-cultural and economic liberation from the upper-castes. For the upper castes, western education also provided economic opportunities but more a medium to reform tradition, especially exemplified in the status of “their” women,

and therefore make the claim for decision-making regarding their respective community. Yet there is no denying the fact that education was not posed as a question in any of these debates. Accepting education as western and as potentially liberating, economically and/or intellectually, is common to all movements and discourses of social reform in the late-nineteenth century. This can only mean that the education debate that began at the level of the government with the Charter Act of 1813 ended with the Resolution of 1835. The debate may have helped form an articulate group of upper-caste individuals but their articulations and emergence into a cohesive group was made possible by the woman question *not* the education one. Infact the petitions of students from Sanskrit college, for example, were no more than petitions for the continuation of the college and were used by members on either side of the debate in the government to make their particular cases. The level of public discourse never reached the proportions in the case of education as it did in the case of the woman question. Infact the education question was resolved without recourse to the creation of an extended public space to debate it. If the education question was resolved in the mid-nineteenth century then the woman's question was resolved by the end of the century. The making of education policy in 1835, besides answering the education question, also provided the structure of a new instrument of colonial governance. Similarly, the legal abolition of sati and infanticide resolved the woman question while also marking legislation as yet another instrument for colonial governance. Colonial governmentality, hence, was firmly entrenched as India headed into the twentieth century or the new century of British rule.